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RECENT" DECISIONS
the contract was "unilateral as to time and hence could be terminated
by either party at any time." 7 It is a well settled rule of law that a
contract of agency, which leaves the agent free to terminate his rela-
tions with the principal upon reasonable notice, must be construed to
confer the same rights upon the principal, unless provisions to the
contrary are stipulated.8 The plaintiff contends that the evidence
presented by the defendant and accepted by the jury was insufficient
to show a termination of the contract and he should recover commis-
sions to the time of the present trial. However, a finding or a judg-
ment by the court on facts will not be disturbed, if there is any
evidence fairly tending to support it, or if sustained by sufficient evi-
dence, or substantially supported by the evidence, 9 and the Court of
Appeals so found in the instant case.
S.C.
CORPORATIONS-RECOVERY OF DECLARED DIVIDENDS-STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS.-Plaintiffs, executors of the estate of Thomas L.
Jacques, deceased, seek to recover the amount of unpaid dividends on
100 shares of preferred stock of the defendant corporation together
with interest. During the period from 1906 to 1938, one H. C. Lloyd
was the owner of record of 100 shares of preferred stock of defendant
corporation. In 1913 decedent, Thomas L. Jacques, acquired the
stock certificate upon the death of his father, who evidently obtained
the certificate by transfer from H. C. Lloyd. Jacques held the certifi-
cates from 1913 until his death in 1931. Until 1938 no attempt was
made to present the certificate for transfer on the books of the defen-
dant corporation. The defendant corporation from 1914 to 1922
declared dividends on this stock. After the declaration of dividends
no sum was set aside from the corporate assets for their ultimate pay-
ment. Entry was made on the books of the corporation of the total
struction Co., 182 App. Div. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 622 (1st Dept. 1918); 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 106 ("A promise that was originally
too indefinite may by performance become definite and as to the other party to
the bargain must be regarded as continuously assenting to receive such per-
formance in return for his promise, a valid unilateral contract arises on receipt
of such performance.").
7Nathan Rubin v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Association, Inc., 284
N. Y. 32, 38, 29 N. E. (2d) 458, 460 (1940) ; cf. Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y.
88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917); Ehrenworth v. Stuhmer & Co., Inc., 229 N. Y. 210,
128 N. E. 10 (1920) (This case must be differentiated from the instant case,
for herein it was agreed in writing that the contract was to last as long as both
parties were in business. The default was by the defendant who was still in
business and bound by the terms of the agreement, hence the plaintiff recovered
damages to the date of the trial.).8 Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing Machine Co. v. Ewing, 141 U. S. 627, 12 Sup. Ct.
94 (1891); Martin v. The New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 117, 42 N. E.
416 (1895) ; Winslow v. Mayo, 195 N. Y. 551, 88 N. E. 1135 (1909).
9 Batchelor v. Hinkle, 210 N. Y. 243, 104 N. E. 629 (1914).
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amount of the dividends. The dividends were not paid. At no time
was the corporation aware of the transfer of the stock until the certifi-
cate was presented to them by the plaintiffs in April, 1938. Trial
court gave judgment for plaintiffs. Upon appeal, held, judgment
reversed, and complaint dismissed on the grounds that the right of the
plaintiff to recover was barred by the six-year period of limitation,
and that the period commences from the time of the declaration of the
dividend in cases where no specific sum is set aside to meet the divi-
dend. Although a demand for payment was necessary, the right to
make the demand was complete when each dividend was payable.
Jacques, et al. v. White Knob Copper and Development Co., Inc., 260
App. Div. 640, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 326 (lst Dept. 1940),
A stockholder has no legal title to the property or profits of the
corporation, until a division is made, or a dividend declared.' Before
a dividend is declared, the intangible right of the stockholder to share
in the earnings of the corporation is a mere incident to the stock and
passes with it on a sale.2 A stockholder may not maintain an action
against a corporation to recover a dividend until one has been de-
clared.8 When a dividend has been declared out of the earnings of a
corporation, such atividend becomes the property of the owners of the
shares of stock no matter whether payable immediately or at a future
time.4 .The declaration of a dividend creates no contractual relation
between the corporation and the stockholder, but creates a debt in
favor of the latter against the corporation. 5 An action at law may be
maintained for its recovery 6 at any time after the date fixed for pay-
ment, and should be brought against the corporation, and not against
the directors personally, unless they converted it to their own use or
by some act changed their relation to it.7  Where the amount of the
dividend has been segregated or set apart into a distinct fund for the
purpose of paying the dividend and is within the dominion of the
directors who refuse to use it for the purpose intended, they become
trustees of the fund and an action in equity may be maintained to reach
the fund and to charge the directors with official misconduct.8 How-
ever, where the money to pay the dividends has never been severed
from the mass of the corporate property, but to all intents and purposes
2 Hyatt v. Allen, 56 N. Y. 553 (1874) ; Jones v. Terre Haute & Richmond
Ry., 57 N. Y. 196 (1874); Beveridge v. New York El. Ry., 112 N. Y. 1, 19
N. E. 489 (1889).
2 Ford v. Snook, 205 App. Div. 194, 199 N. Y. Supp. 630 (4th Dept. 1923),
aff'd, 240 N. Y. 624, 148 N. E. 732 (1925).
3 Godley v. Crandall & Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1912).4 Brundage v. Brundage, 65 Barb. 397 (N. Y. 1873), afI'd, 60 N. Y. 544
(1875) ; Robertson v. Debrulatour, 188 N. Y. 301, 80 N. E. 938 (1907).
5 See note 3, supra.
6Jones v. Terre Haute & Richmond R. R., 57 N. Y. 196 (1874) ; Godley
v. Crandall & Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1912).
7 Searles v. Gebbie, 115 App. Div. 778, 101 N. Y. Supp. 199 (4th Dept.
1906), aff'd, 190 N. Y. 553, 83 N. E. 1131 (1907). '8 LeRoy v. Globe Ins. Co., 2 Edw. Ch. 657 (N. Y. 1836) ; King v. Patter-
son & Hudson River R. R., 29 N. J. L. 89 (1860).
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remains a part of it, the action is maintainable only against the cor-
poration.9 In the instant case the mere entry by the corporation on its
books of the total amount of each dividend did not put the defendant in
the position of a trustee.'0 Where the relationship between the cor-
poration and its stockholder is that of debtor and creditor, and no
equitable considerations are present, the latter's right to recover
declared, but unpaid dividends may be barred by the operation of the
statute of limitations.:" In an action to recover a dividend the stock-
holder must prove the making of the dividend and a demand for pay-
ment.12 Where a right exists, but a demand for payment is necessary
to entitle a person to maintain an action, the time within which the
action must be commenced must be computed from the time when the
right to make the demand is complete. 13 The right to make the
demand is complete when each dividend becomes payable and, conse-
quently, the statute commences to run from that time.14 The non-
payment of the dividend gives rise to a cause of action for a simple
debt which must be commenced within six years under the New York
statute.15 Similarly, it has been held that an interest coupon, detached
from a corporate bond, and providing that the maker would pay to
bearer a named sum on a date certain, is a simple contract obligation
to pay and subject to the six-year statute of limitations.10 The debtor
and creditor relationship held to exist in the instant case was recog-
nized in a suit by the United States for dividends declared on stock
held by it in a private corporation, although the right to set up a state
statute of limitations was denied upoft the ground that it could not bind
a sovereign. 17 In Texas, the courts, while recognizing the declared and
unpaid dividend as a debt, incline to the view that the corporation's
holding of the dividends, until demand is made, is in the nature of a
trustee relation, which requires notice to a cestui que trust of the trus-
tee's repudiation of the trust before the statute of limitations can be set
in motion against him.'8
J. J. T.
9 Lowne v. American Fire Ins. Co., et at., 6 Paige 482 (N. Y. 1837).
'
0 Jacques, et at. v. White Knob Copper and Development Co., Inc., 260
App. Div. 640, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 326 (1st Dept. 1940).
".1Jacques, et al. v. White Knob Copper and Development Co., Inc., 260
App. Div. 640, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 326 (1st Dept. 1940) ; Winchester, etc., Turn-
pike Co. v. Wickliffe, 100 Ky. 531, 38 S. W. 86 (1897).
12 Scott V. Central R. R. & Banking Corp., 52 Barb. 45 (N. Y. 1868).
23 N. Y. Civ. PRAC AcT § 15.
14 100 Ky. 531, 38 S. W. 866 (1897).
25 N. Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT §48(1).
26 Dickerson v. Wilkes-Barre & H. R. R., 100 N. J. L. 80, 124 Atd. 512
(1924), aff'd, 103 N. J. L. 175, 143 Atl. 618 (1926).
'7 Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co. v. United States, 223 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 3d,
1915).
28 Yeaman v. Galveston City Co.. 106 Tex. 389, 167 S. W. 710 (1914).
